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THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER AND
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Richard Falk famously argued that domestic courts should operate
as "agents of the international order."1 Recent academic debates
over the role of international law in the U.S. legal system, and over
the relevance of foreign and international materials in U.S. constitutional interpretation, are at least in part debates about this
proposition. Modern variants of Falk's claim can be found in the
works of scholars such as Harold Koh, Jennifer Martinez, and AnneMarie Slaughter.' These and other "internationalist" scholars consider the U.S. judiciary as part of a "global community of courts,"
emphasize the values of international cross-fertilization and harmonization, and view international law as directly permeating, and
often having primacy within, the U.S. legal system. "Constitutionalist" or "revisionist" scholars, by contrast, distinguish between the
international and domestic legal systems, emphasize constitutional
structure as a limitation on the domestic effect of international law,
and generally advocate political branch rather than judicial control
over the domestic implementation of international legal obligaCurtis A. Bradley is the Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law at Duke Law School.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Thanks to Kathy Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Joost Pauwelyn, Eric Posner,
Paul Stephan, Carlos Vazquez, Mark Weisburd, and Ernest Young for helpful comments.
Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the InternationalLegal Order 72 (1964).
2 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 Neb L Rev 181 (1996);

Jennifer Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429 (2003);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va J Intl L 1103 (2000).
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tions.3 The leading judicial proponent of the internationalist perspective is currently Justice Breyer; the leading judicial proponent
of the constitutionalist perspective is currently Justice Scalia.
Debates between internationalists and constitutionalists encompass a wide variety of legal issues. These issues include the status
in the U.S. legal system of customary international law, the circumstances under which treaties are domestically enforceable, the
extent to which the federal government can delegate regulatory
functions to international actors, and the relevance of federalism to
U.S. foreign relations. The practical significance of these debates
continues to grow, as the United States, despite its isolationist reputation, becomes increasingly enmeshed in international regimes.
As the need and opportunities for international cooperation have
increased, multilateral regulatory treaties have proliferated, as have
international institutions established to administer them. These institutions include a growing number of dispute resolution bodies
that consider issues that overlap and intersect with the issues considered by U.S. courts.
Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon4 was an important test case for the internationalist perspective. The petitioners there, with the support of
internationalist scholars, were seeking to have the Supreme Court
create domestic remedies to help effectuate compliance with a multilateral treaty, and to set aside traditional state law procedures in
order to implement an interpretation of the treaty that had been
adopted by an international tribunal. In rejecting this effort in Sanchez-Llamas, the Court made clear that the Article m federal judicial
power plays an important mediating role between the United States
and the international legal system. Under the Court's approach, international law neither gives U.S. courts special powers nor limits
their authority to decide cases, and U.S. courts are to consider the
application of international law against the backdrop of traditional
domestic remedial and procedural restrictions, even if the result is
disuniformity in treaty interpretation.
While one should be cautious about reading too much into a
single decision, the Court's approach to the federal judicial power
in Sanchez-Llamas has potential relevance to a number of foreign
' Although hardly uniform in their approach to particular issues, scholars commonly
associated with the constitutionalist approach include myself, Jack Goldsmith, Julian Ku,
Eric Posner, Paul Stephan, Mark Weisburd, John Yoo, and Ernest Young.
' 126 S Ct 2669 (2006).
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relations law issues. In this regard, Sanchez-Llamas may have broader
significance than the more widely discussed decision issued by the
Court a day later, Hamdan v Rumsfeld,5 in which the Court held
that the military commission system established by President Bush
to try terrorist detainees was invalid. Hamdan may seem like a monumental decision, in that it repudiated one of the components of
the Bush administration's legal strategy in the war on terrorism and
seemed to give little deference to the administration's views about
the scope of international law. The Court's decision there, however,
ultimately rests on a particular construction of statutory provisions
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (provisions that Congress
has since amended), and the Court's lack of deference may stem
from facts specific to the war on terrorism, including the fact that
the administration had never actually tried anyone in the military
commission system that the Court was invalidating. Moreover,
whereas Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas, he did not even participate in Hamdan, so, to the extent
that those decisions overlap, Sanchez-Llamas would seem to be a
better indicator of the likely approach of the Roberts Court.
Part I of this essay briefly describes the Sanchez-Llamas decision
and explains how the federal judicial power played a central role in
the Court's analysis. As explained in this part, the majority viewed
the federal judicial power as imposing both a restrainton the federal
courts' ability to advance the international order, and a protection
against the delegation of the federal courts' adjudicative functions
to that order. Part II considers potential implications of these two
functions of restraint and protection for various foreign relations
law issues. Part IH outlines several benefits of these two functions
of the judicial power in light of the current conditions of the international adjudicative system.
I.

SANCHEZ-LLAMAS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

This part briefly summarizes the Sanchez-Llamas decision
and explains the central relevance of the federal judicial power to
the decision. Next, it compares the decision with the Court's widely
discussed decision a day later in Hamdan v Rumsfeld. Finally, it
considers whether the treaty provision at issue in Sanchez-Llamas
s 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
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confers judicially enforceable individual rights, an issue expressly
left open by the majority.
6

BACKGROUND

A.

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is a multilateral
treaty that addresses a variety of issues concerning the exercise of
consular functions and the privileges and immunities of consular
officials.7 Sanchez-Llamas concerned Article 36 of this Convention,
which provides that when foreign nationals from other party countries are arrested, they are to be informed without delay that they
have the right to have their consulate notified of the arrest and
to communicate with the consulate.8 Article 36 also states that
these rights "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however,
that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended."9 The United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969. At the same time, it also ratified an "optional
protocol" to the treaty providing that disputes between nations
arising under the treaty could be heard in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) that sits in The Hague, in the Netherlands. °
State police in the United States have often failed to inform
foreign nationals of their rights under Article 36 when arresting
them. Before the mid-1990s, however, these violations were rarely
the subject of U.S. court litigation. This changed with the Breard
case. There, a Paraguayan citizen on death row in Virginia filed
a federal habeas corpus action alleging that he should receive either
a new trial or sentencing proceeding because he had never been
advised of his right to have his consulate notified of his arrest. As
the lower courts began to deny him relief, and as his execution
date approached, the nation of Paraguay filed an action against
the United States in the ICJ, seeking to have the Court order a
6

My description here draws on Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDecisions:Sanchez-Llamas

J Intl L 882 (2006).
' See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS
261.
v Oregon, 100 Am

Id,Art 36(l)(b).
Id, Art 36(2).
oSee Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr 24,
1963, 21 UST 77, 169, 596 UNI'TS 487, 488.
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new trial for Breard. About five days before the scheduled execution, the ICJ issued a provisional order stating that the United
States should "take all measures at its disposal" to ensure that
Breard was not executed while the Court considered the case." l
At this point, the case had also reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
which declined to grant a stay of execution, concluding that
Breard's Vienna Convention claim had been procedurally defaulted because he had failed to raise it in a timely manner in the
state courts.12 While recognizing that it should give "respectful
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such,"
the Court reasoned that absent "a clear and express statement to
the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State."13 One such procedural
rule in the United States, explained the Court, is that "assertions
of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court
in order to form the basis for relief in habeas."14 Although the
U.S. government took the position that the ICJ's provisional order
was not binding, the Secretary of State at that time, Madeline
Albright, wrote a letter to Virginia's governor, asking him voluntarily to stay the execution. The governor declined, however,
and Breard was executed. Paraguay subsequently withdrew its case
from the ICJ. 5
A similar case, LaGrand,6 was initiated in the ICJ by Germany
in 1999. LaGrand concerned two brothers of German citizenship
on death row in Arizona, one of whom was executed shortly before
Germany brought its case. The Court issued a provisional order
directing the United States to take all measures at its disposal to
stay the execution of the other brother. Once again, however, the
" See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguayv United States), Provisional
Measures, 1998 ICJ Rep 248, para 41 (Apr 9).
2 See Breard v Greene, 523 US 371, 375 (1998). A group of international law professors
filed a statement with the Court unsuccessfully urging a stay of execution. See Statement
Amicus Curiae of International Law Professors, Republic of Paraguay v Gilmore, No 971390 (US Supreme Court).
" 523 US at 375.
14 Id.
"5For additional discussion of the Breard litigation, see Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51 Stan L Rev 529 (1999); Agora:
Breard, 92 Am J Intl L 666 (1998).
16 LaGrand (FederalRepublic of Germany v United States), 2001 ICJ Rep 466, paras 67,
73, 77, 91 (June 27).
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execution was carried out on schedule. Unlike Paraguay in the
Breard case, however, Germany did not abandon its case at this
point, but rather pressed on for a judgment. Subsequently, in June
2001, the ICJ issued a final decision, concluding that Article 36
of the Vienna Convention confers not only state-to-state rights
but also individual rights, that the United States had violated these
individual rights with respect to the German brothers, and that
U.S. court application of procedural default rules had prevented
"full effect" from being given to the rights under Article 36.'" The
ICJ also concluded that, in the future, when German nationals
are sentenced to severe penalties in the United States without their
Article 36 rights being respected, the United States would be obligated to provide for "review and reconsideration" of their convictions and sentences in light of the violation.'" The ICJ noted,
however, that this "obligation can be carried out in various ways"
and that the "choice of means must be left to the United States."' 9
LaGrandset the stage for the Avena case.2" In early 2003, Mexico
filed an action against the United States in the ICJ on behalf of
fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row throughout the United
States, alleging that they had not been notified of their rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. This was a particularly
significant case, since it resembled a class action rather than just
a challenge to a particular execution. In February 2003, the Court
issued a provisional order directing the United States not to execute three of the individuals who appeared to be at greatest risk
of execution in the coming months.2 ' This time, none of the individuals was executed while the Court considered the case.
In March 2004, the ICJ issued its judgment on the merits. The
Court held that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals, and that it was required to provide these Mexican nationals with review and reconsideration of their convictions and sentences as a result of
having failed to notify them of their consular rights. In its opinion,
Id, paras 67, 73, 77, 91.
Id,Para 125.
19Id.
20Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States), 2004 ICJ
No 128 (Judgment Mar 31).
"1See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States), Provisional Measures, 2003 ICJ 128 (Feb 5).
'7
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the Court reasoned that Article 36 confers individual rights, and
that the proper remedy for a violation of these rights is "review
and reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the United States
courts . . .with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the
violation of Article 36. . .caused actual prejudice to the defendant
in the process of administration of criminal justice."22 The ICJ
further suggested that procedural default rules should not be applied to bar this review and reconsideration because the application
of such rules would prevent full effect from being given to the
rights.23
After the Avena decision, the Executive Branch took the position
that the ICJ had erred in its construction of the Convention. In
a case involving one of the Mexican nationals covered by Avenain which the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari but subsequently dismissed the writ as improvidently granted 24 -the Executive Branch filed a brief arguing, among other things, that
Article 36 did not confer any private, judicially enforceable rights,
that the article did not preclude application of procedural default
rules, and that the Avena decision was not directly enforceable in
U.S. courts.2" The brief informed the Supreme Court, however,
that President Bush had written a memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General stating that the United States, "in accordance with
general principles of comity," would discharge its obligations under Avena by having its state courts provide review and reconsideration in the fifty-one cases covered by Avena, and that this memorandum would, it was argued, override state procedural default
rules.26 About a week later, the U.S. Secretary of State sent a letter
to the UN Secretary-General stating that the United States was
withdrawing from the optional protocol that gives the ICJ jurisdiction over Vienna Convention disputes.2 7
22See 2004 ICJ No 128, at para 121.
23
1Id, para

113.

24See Medellin v Dretke, 544 US 660 (2005).
25See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 9, Medellin
v Dretke, No 04-5928 (US Supreme Court, Feb 2005).
26 See id at 38-48; Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, Wash Post, Mar
10, 2005, at A01.
27 See Memorandum for the Attorney General, "Compliance with the Decision of the
International Court ofJustice in Avena" (Feb 28, 2005), at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/
2005-03- 10_Avena-compliance.pdf.
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AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

Sanchez-Llamas involved two consolidated state cases, one from
Oregon and one from Virginia.28 In each case, state police had
failed to advise a foreign citizen of his rights under Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention. In the Oregon case, a Mexican citizen
was seeking suppression of incriminating statements as a remedy
for the treaty violation, and in the Virginia case a Honduran citizen
was seeking to overcome state rules of procedural default that
would otherwise prevent him from raising the treaty violation for
the first time in state postconviction proceedings. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on three questions: "(1) whether Article
36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked
by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2) whether suppression of
evidence is a proper remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3)
whether an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state
procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim at
trial.

29

In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, a majority of
the Court rejected the claims of both petitioners. The Court did
not take a position on whether Article 36 confers judicially enforceable individual rights. The Court reasoned that, even if Article 36 does confer such rights, suppression of evidence is not an
appropriate remedy for violations of that article, and that the article does not override state rules of procedural default.
The Court emphasized the federal judicial power in both its
analysis of the suppression issue and its analysis of the procedural
default issue. In concluding that there was no suppression of evidence remedy for violations of Article 36, the Court rejected the
argument that it could use its remedial authority to promote state
court compliance with Article 36. The Court explained that "our
authority to create a judicial remedy applicable in state court must
lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself."3 ° Imposing a remedy not
provided for by the Convention, the Court noted, would be "enlarging the obligations of the United States under the Vienna
Convention," which would be "entirely inconsistent with the ju21

See 126 S Ct 2669 (2006).

29 Id

at 2677.

30 Id at 2679.
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dicial function."3 1 The Court concluded that, "where a treaty does
not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it
is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States through
lawmaking of their own."32 In other words, regardless of whether
fashioning a suppression remedy would promote U.S. compliance
with Article 36, limitations on the judicial power meant that this
was not an appropriate task for the federal courts.
In concluding that Article 36 did not override state rules of
procedural default, despite the ICJ's view that it did, the Court
similarly focused on the judicial power-this time as something
to be protected rather than kept in check. The Court rejected the
argument, advanced by a group of international law professors in
an amicus curiae brief,33 that the Court was obligated to accept
as "authoritative" the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention. The Court explained that, although the ICJ's interpretation
deserves "respectful consideration," when treaties are being applied as federal law, the ultimate authority to interpret them must
rest with the domestic U.S. court system, not an international
tribunal. Citing Marbury v Madison, the Court stated that "[i]f
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system,
determining their meaning as a matter of federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,' headed
by 'one Supreme Court' established by the Constitution."34 Invoking stare decisis, the Court also reasoned that its "respectful
consideration" of the ICJ's views "does not compel us to reconsider
our understanding of the Convention in Breard."3
In sum, the Court's conception of the federal judicial power is
that it operates both as a limitation on the federal courts' ability
to participate in the international order, and also as a protection
of the federal courts from that order. In particular, the Court
appeared to deny itself a foreign affairs lawmaking power, even
for the purpose of promoting treaty compliance, while at the same
time suggesting that there are limitations on the extent to which
3'Id.
32Id at 2680.
33See Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, at 2-3, 20, 25 and n 41, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, Nos 04-10566, 05-51 (US
Supreme Court).
34126 S Ct at 2684.
5,Id at 2683.
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the federal judicial power may be diluted through U.S. participation in international adjudication.
Justice Breyer issued a dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter, and joined in part by Justice Ginsburg.36 These four
Justices reasoned that Article 36 provides an individual right that
can be invoked by criminal defendants in domestic proceedings.
They also argued that sometimes suppression is an appropriate
remedy for violations of Article 36, and that sometimes state procedural default rules must be set aside. Three of these Justices
(but not Justice Ginsburg) thought it appropriate to remand for
a determination of whether those remedies should be applied to
these particular cases. Although these Justices stated that they
would assume that the ICJ's interpretation was not binding on the
Court, they suggested that it should be given more weight than
it was given by the majority, in the interest of promoting uniformity of treaty interpretation.37
C.

COMPARISON WITH HAMDAN

In public discussions, the Sanchez-Llamas decision was overshadowed by the Court's decision a day later in Hamdan v Rumsfeld.3 8 In Hamdan, the Court invalidated the military commission
system that President Bush had established after the September
11 attacks to try terrorist "enemy combatants." The Court based
its decision, in part, on purported inconsistencies between the
military commission system and a treaty provision-Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3 9
The Court's reliance on a treaty provision to invalidate Executive action in Hamdan might appear to be in tension with the
limited judicial role for enforcing treaties suggested in SanchezLlamas. However, the Court in Hamdan, and Justice Kennedy in
his concurrence, emphasized that the treaty provision there was
36See id at 2690-2709 (Breyer, J, dissenting).

31See id at 2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting). In what can only be described as a creative
reading of the Avena decision, these Justices also suggested that a hearing in which procedural default rules were applied might itself satisfy the ICJ's requirement of "review
and reconsideration," and that it would be consistent with Avena for states to apply procedural default rules as long as the defendant could pursue an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim based on the failure of his lawyer to raise the Article 36 claim in time. See
id at 2698, 2702-03 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
38 See 126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
" See id at 2 793-97.
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being applied because Congress had implicitly directed its domestic application. The Court explained, for example, that "regardless of the nature of the rights conferred [by Common Article
3] . . . they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the
law of war," and "compliance with the law of war is the condition
upon which the authority [for military commissions] set forth in
[the Uniform Code of Military Justice] is granted."4 The Court
did not conceive of Hamdan, therefore, as a case in which courts
were being asked to act, independently of the political branches,
in providing remedies for breaches of international law. Nor, unlike in Sanchez-Llamas, was the Court being asked to defer to an
international body's construction of the treaty. Furthermore, both
decisions considered international law against the backdrop of traditional U.S. procedures. Whereas in Sanchez-Llamas these procedures included procedural default and stare decisis, in Hamdan
they concerned the procedures that had traditionally been used
for military courts-martial. 4 ' Even at the more general level of
respect for international law, Sanchez-Llamas and Hamdan are not
inconsistent. Whatever one may think of the Court's ultimate
conclusions in Sanchez-Llamas, it is difficult to dispute that the
Court took the international law arguments seriously. The Court
carefully parsed the language of Article 36, examined its drafting
history, and considered how other nations had been enforcing it.
Moreover, in considering the proper remedy and the effect of state
procedural rules, the Court treated the Article 36 violation in
much the same way that it would treat violations of other federal
law. The fact that it perceived structural and procedural restraints
on its ability to grant the relief requested does not show disrespect
for international law. As the Court explained, "[i]t is no slight to
the Convention to deny petitioners' claims under the same principles we would apply to an Act of Congress, or to the Constitution
itself."4 2
There is one way, however, in which the two decisions do seem
inconsistent. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has given substantial deference to the Executive Branch's interpretations of treaties,
stating, for example, that these interpretations are entitled to
o Id at 2794; see also id at 2774, 2786; id at 2802 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
" See, e.g., id at 2788 ("[Tlhe procedures governing trials by military commission historically have been the same as those governing courts-martial.").
41 Id at 2688.
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"great weight."4 3 The majority in Sanchez-Llamas cited and quoted
with approval from this line of authority and ultimately agreed
with the Executive Branch's views regarding the implications of
Article 36 for suppression of evidence and procedural default. In
Hamdan, however, the Court interpreted Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions to apply to a conflict between the United
States and a nonstate terrorist organization, and it did not appear
to give much deference to a contrary interpretation by the Executive Branch.' 4 It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice
Roberts did not participate in Hamdan, so Sanchez-Llamas is probably a better indicator than Hamdan of how the Roberts Court is
likely to approach treaty cases.4" Moreover, the Court's lack of
deference to the Executive Branch in Hamdan might have stemmed
from factors specific to U.S. policy at Guantinamo Bay-such as
the international public relations difficulties engendered by the
U.S. detention facility and the long delay in initiating any military
commission trials there-and may not be indicative of more general views relating to treaty deference.
D.

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE

36

As noted above, four Justices in Sanchez-Llamas-the three dissenting Justices, and Justice Ginsburg-made clear that they believed that Article 36 confers judicially enforceable private rights.
The majority did not take a position on this issue, stating that it
would "assume, without deciding, that Article 36 does grant [the
petitioners] such rights. '4 6 This issue presumably will arise in other
litigation-for example, on direct review where there is no procedural default bar, and where remedies other than suppression
of evidence are sought (such as a new sentencing hearing). Prior
to Sanchez-Llamas, the lower courts were divided on the issue.47
"3 See, e.g., United States v Stuart, 489 US 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184-85 (1982); Kolovrat v Oregon, 366 US 187, 194 (1961).
4 See 126 S Ct at 2795-96.
4' Roberts recused himself in Hamdan because he had participated in the decision under
review. In that decision, Roberts had joined in an opinion holding, among other things,
that the Geneva Conventions do not confer judicially enforceable private rights. See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 415 F3d 33, 3840 (DC Cir 2005).
6126 S Ct at 2677-78.
41Compare.Jogi v Voges, 425 F3d 367 (7th Cir 2005) (concluding that Article 36 confers
judicially enforceable private rights), with United States v Jimenez-Nava, 243 F3d 192,
195-98 (5th Cir 2001) (concluding that Article 36 does not confer judicially enforceable
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Textually, this issue appears to be a closer one than the suppression and procedural default issues decided in Sanchez-Llamas.
Article 36 imposes mandatory obligations on arresting authorities
and specifically refers to "rights."48 Moreover, some of the functional and constitutional concerns associated with implying a suppression remedy or an override of procedural default rules do not
apply to this issue, since it is not uncommon for federal statutes
to confer individual rights, including rights enforceable in state
courts. On the other hand, there is no mention of judicial enforcement in the Vienna Convention, and the preamble to the
Convention states that the purpose of the privileges and immunities set forth in the Convention "is not to benefit individuals
but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular
posts on behalf of their respective States." Although the ICJ has
concluded that Article 36 does confer individual rights, its reasoning on this issue, like the procedural default issue, is presumably entitled only to "respectful consideration." Moreover, it is
not entirely clear that this is a question of treaty interpretation,
as opposed to a question of U.S. law governing the circumstances
under which a law should be viewed as allowing for private enforcement.
This issue of private treaty enforcement implicates broader debates in the literature over the extent to which treaties should be
viewed like federal statutes. On the one hand, the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution refers to treaties, along with federal
statutes and the Constitution, as the "supreme Law of the Land."4 9
On the other hand, treaties, unlike statutes, are international contracts, and by definition concern U.S. foreign relations. As a result,
it is arguable that they should be less amenable than statutes to
direct judicial enforcement. This may partially explain the special
doctrine of "non-self-execution" that has existed since the early
1800s, pursuant to which some treaties are viewed as judicially
unenforceable until they are implemented by Congress.5" As treaties have grown in number and breadth, this concept of non-selfprivate rights). Many courts prior to Sanchez-Llamas had avoided deciding this question,
instead holding simply that Article 36 did not confer the particular remedies being sought
in those cases (such as suppression of evidence).
" See Vienna Convention, Art 36(1)(b) ("The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.").
" US Const, Art VI.
50
See Foster v Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253, 314 (1829).
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execution has also grown, to the dismay of internationalist commentators who view the doctrine as in tension with the Supremacy
Clause and as undermining U.S. compliance with international
law. Constitutionalist scholars, by contrast, tend to see the doctrine
as a means of fostering democratic deliberation in the implementation of modern treaties.5
The term "self execution" has in turn become a highly confusing
concept, in part because it is often used to mean different propositions.52 It is sometimes used simply to suggest the lack of a
need for implementing legislation. At other times, it is used to
suggest judicial enforceability. In still other instances, it may denote the existence of a private cause of action. Litigants, not surprisingly, seek to use this ambiguity to their advantage. In SanchezLlamas, for example, the petitioners and their amicus supporters
pointed out that when the Vienna Convention was originally submitted to the Senate, the State Department had testified that the
Convention was "entirely self-executive and does not require any
implementing or complementing legislation." 3 This statement,
however, was probably intended simply to signify that the treaty
did not need implementing legislation to become operative, not
necessarily to suggest that the treaty would be privately enforceable in domestic courts.
The position of the current administration is that treaties are
presumptively not enforceable by private parties. In its amicus
brief in Sanchez-Llamas, the Executive Branch maintained that "[i]t
is a long-established presumption that treaties and other international agreements do not create judicially enforceable individual
rights."5 4 It is far from clear, however, that there is any such general
presumption, although it may be true that of the vast number of
treaties today, most do not confer judicially enforceable individual
rights. The Executive relies heavily on the Head Money Cases for
" See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 457-59 (2000).
52 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl
L 695 (1995).
51 See Brief for Petitioner Mario A. Bustillo, at 20, Bustillo v Johnson, No 05-51 (US
Supreme Court, Dec 2005); Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas, at 13, SanchezLlamas v Oregon, No 04-10566 (US Supreme Court, Dec 22, 2005); Brief of International
Court of Justice Experts, at 20 (cited in note 33).
" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 11, Bustillo
v Johnson, Nos 05-51, 04-10566 (US Supreme Court, Jan 2006).
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the purported presumption, but that decision (which stands for
the different proposition that Congress has the authority to override treaties for purposes of U.S. law) contains language that cuts
both ways. While noting that "[a] treaty is primarily a compact
between independent nations" that "depends for the enforcement
of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments
which are parties to it," the Court also observed that "a treaty
may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the
citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial
limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law,
and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties
in the courts of the country."5 Moreover, in some contexts, such
as extradition and alien property rights, treaties (particularly bilateral treaties) have long been treated as conferring judicially enforceable private rights.56
The debate over whether treaties should be viewed like statutes
is complicated even more by disagreements over the proper baseline. Whereas the Executive Branch resists the analogy to statutes
out of concern that it would expand judicial enforcement of treaties, that may depend on the type of statute covered by the analogy.
If modern treaties are like regulatory statutes, it is arguable that
57
the presumption would still be against private enforcement.
Many important regulatory statutes, after all, have been found not
to confer judicially enforceable individual rights.5 8 Viewed this
way, it is easier to see why the mere fact that treaties are listed in
the Supremacy Clause is not dispositive of the issue of private
judicial enforcement.
There are suggestions in Sanchez-Llamas that the majority might
not be receptive to allowing private judicial enforcement of Article
36. The majority noted that "diplomatic avenues" are "the primary
means of enforcing the Convention," and it stated that there "is
reason to doubt" that Article 36 requires a judicial remedy.5 9 The
" Edye v Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 US 580, 598 (1884).
16 See, e.g., Clark v Allen, 331 US 503 (1947); Asakura v Seattle, 265 US 332 (1924);
United States v Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886).
57 See Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations after Sanchez-Llamas,
11
Lewis and Clark L Rev 65 (2007).
58 See, e.g., Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273 (2002) (Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974); Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275 (2001) (Section 602 of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
s'126 S Ct at 2680, 2682.
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majority also made clear that it would give some deference to the
Executive Branch's construction of Article 36, and the Executive
Branch has for a number of years taken the position that this article
does not confer judicially enforceable private rights.6" As with
many issues that the Roberts Court will address, Justice Kennedy's
views are likely to be critical here. His vote and concurrence in
Hamdan might suggest that he is receptive to private judicial enforcement of treaties. As noted above, however, Justice Kennedy
made clear that the Court was enforcing the treaty provision in
Hamdan because of an underlying statutory incorporation, 6 '
whereas there has been no statutory incorporation of Article 36
of the Vienna Convention.

II.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR

U.S.

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

This part considers potential implications for U.S. foreign
relations law of both the restrictive and protective roles for the
judicial power envisioned in Sanchez-Llamas. The part concludes
by assessing the implications of these functions for the enforceability of President Bush's 2005 memorandum, in which he stated
that the United States would comply with the ICJ's decision in
Avena by having state courts give effect to the decision in the fiftyone cases covered by the decision.
A.

THE JUDICIAL POWER AS LIMITATION

The limiting function of the judicial power envisioned in Sanchez-Llamas is potentially relevant to at least four issues in U.S.
foreign relations law: judicial federalism, the viability of dormant
foreign relations preemption, the domestic application of customary international law, and the scope of the Charming Betsy canon
of construction. The organizing theme for these issues concerns
the default role of the courts. Under the internationalist approach,
U.S. courts are to act independently from the political branches
in promoting U.S. internationalism, subject to post hoc political
branch correction. Under the constitutionalist approach as reflected in Sanchez-Llamas, by contrast, decisions about U.S. internationalism are to be made in the first instance by the political
'o See UnitedStates v Li, 206 F3d 56,63 (Ist Cir 2000) (quoting view of State Department
that the Vienna Convention is not a treaty "establishing rights of individuals").
" See note 40.
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branches, through processes designed to protect structural constitutional values.
1. Judicialfederalism. The conventional wisdom among internationalist scholars is that federalism is irrelevant to U.S. foreign
relations law. Professor Louis Henkin reflects this view in stating
that, "as regards U.S. foreign relations, the states 'do not exist."' 62
There is Supreme Court dicta supporting this view, particularly
in cases from the 1930s and 1940s.6 3
This conventional wisdom has never mapped well onto reality.
States and localities routinely engage in a host of actions that can
affect foreign relations, and almost none of it is subject to federal
preemption.' They arrest and try foreign nationals, decide whether
to apply foreign law and enforce foreign judgments, and form a
variety of commercial and other relationships with other countries.
Moreover, the federal political branches have long considered federalism in deciding which treaties to ratify, in attaching various reservations to U.S. ratification of treaties, and in crafting legislation to
implement treaties.6" And, whether it is claimed opportunistically or
with genuine conviction, the political branches have often suggested
that federalism places constitutional restrictions on their activities in
foreign relations.66 This has been true even in the Vienna Convention
litigation: In the Breard litigation before the Supreme Court, the
Executive Branch maintained that "our federal system imposes limits
on the federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal
justice system of the States."67 In arguing the LaGrand case before
the ICJ, the Executive Branch stated that "[f]ederal Government
officials do not have legal power to stop peremptorily the enforce62Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 150 (2d ed 1996).
63 See, e.g., United States v Pink, 315 US 203, 233 (1942) ("[P]ower over external affairs

is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); United
States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937) ("[I]n respect of our foreign relations generally,
state lines disappear. As to such purpose . . . the State does not exist."). Both of these
decisions involved the preemption of state law through a "sole executive agreement"that is, an international agreement concluded with another country solely by the President.
" See generally Dennis J. Palumbo, The States and American -Foreign Relations (1960);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617 (1997).
6 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to
U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 Am J Ind L 675 (1998); Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism:
Forging New Federalist Constraintson the Treaty Power, 79 S Cal L Rev 1327 (2006).
66 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 Mich L
Rev 98, 131-32 (2000) (providing examples).
67 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v Greene, Nos 97-8214,
97-1390 (US Supreme Court).
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ment of a criminal sentence by the state of Arizona."68
Recent academic debates on this topic have primarily concerned
the extent to which federalism restricts the authority of the federal
political branches. One issue that has generated particular controversy is whether the treaty power is subject to federalism restrictions. The Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Missouri v Holland
holds that the treaty power is not subject to the federalism limitations applicable to legislation.6 9 Academic debates have focused
on the continued vitality of Hollandin light of the Supreme Court's
renewed commitment to federalism in the domestic arena, and the
expansion of treatymaking to encompass a variety of matters that
were traditionally of state and local concern.7" A number of intermediate positions have arisen in the debate, including the proposition that "anti-commandeering" and state sovereign immunity
limitations apply to the treaty power even if that power is not subject
to the Article I limitations applicable to legislation,7' and the proposition that federalism restricts executive agreements but not Article
II treaties.72
Sanchez-Llamas reminds us that federalism can be relevant in a
different way to foreign relations law-not as a limitation on the
political branches, but rather as a limitation on the role of the courts.
Federalism values were directly implicated in Sanchez-Llamas. The
two consolidated cases arose from state courts, and they concerned
issues of criminal law and procedure, core areas of state interest.73
The Supreme Court did not question the authority of the political
68 Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of America, LaGrand Case, para
124 (Mar 27, 2000), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
69 See Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920).
71See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich L Rev 390
(1998); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundationsof the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich L Rev 1075 (2000); Bradley, 99 Mich
L Rev (cited in note 66); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118
Harv L Rev 1867 (2005).
"' See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 Va J Intl
L 713 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U Colo L
Rev 1317 (1999).
7 See, e.g., David Sloss, InternationalAgreements and the PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism,

55 Stan L Rev 1693 (2003).
71Cf. United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 617 (2000) ("The regulation and punishment
of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States."); UnitedStates
v Lopez, 514 US 549, 561 n 3 (1995) ("Under our federal system, the 'States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."') (citations omitted).
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branches to displace state law through the treaty power, noting that
"where a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is
no issue of intruding on the constitutional prerogatives of the
States." 74 In rejecting the petitioners' arguments, however, the
Court emphasized the relevance of federalism to the scope of the
judicial power. The Court disclaimed any supervisory authority over
state court proceedings, even for the purpose of effectuating compliance with international law.75 The Court also stated that, "where
a treaty does not provide a particular remedy. . . it is not for the
federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of
their own."76 Justice Ginsburg similarly emphasized judicial federalism in her concurrence. Noting that federal courts are allowed
to apply procedural default rules to bar treaty claims, including
claims under the Vienna Convention, Justice Ginsburg expressed
the view that:
it would be unseemly, to say the least, for this Court to command
state courts to relax their identical, or even less stringent procedural default rules, while federal courts operate without constraint in this regard. That state of affairs, surely productive of
friction in our federal system, should be resisted if there is a
plausible choice, i.e., if a reasonable interpretation of the federal
77
statute and international accord would avoid the conflict.
There is an often overlooked connection between this sort of
judicial federalism and arguments for not enforcing federalism limits
against the political branches. The most frequently cited argument
for why the courts should not enforce federalism restraints is that
state interests are adequately addressed in the political process.78
To the extent that this argument has merit (and its empirical validity
is contested), it may be particularly strong with respect to Article
II treaties, which require the advice and consent of two-thirds of

126 S Ct at 2680.
See id at 2679.
76 Id at 2680.
74
7'

77 Id

at 2689 (Ginsburg, J, concurring).

78 See generally Jesse H. Choper, JudicialReview and the National Political Process (1980);

Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954). See also
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 550-53 (1985).
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the Senate.79 These process protections, however, do not apply to
actions by the federal judiciary. By subjecting the judicial power to
federalism limitations, courts help ensure that the political process
protections for federalism actually operate.8"
2. Viability of dormant foreign relationspreemption. Judicial federalism is in turn relevant to a separate foreign relations law issue,
which is whether courts should subject state and local laws to "dormant" foreign relations preemption. The Constitution prohibits the
states from engaging in certain foreign relations activities, such as
treaty-making, and it grants the federal government broad authority
to preempt other state foreign affairs activities. This constitutional
structure might naturally be read to suggest that when states are
not engaging in activities expressly prohibited by the Constitution,
they are subject to preemption only when the political branches
actually exercise their preemptive authority."' Some commentators
contend, however, that the federal courts should enforce a "dormant" preemption to ensure that states do not unduly intrude on
the ability of the United States to speak with "one voice."82
The Supreme Court has applied dormant foreign relations pre83
emption only once, in the Cold War decision, Zschernig v Miller.
The issue there was the validity of an Oregon inheritance statute
that effectively disallowed residents of communist countries from
inheriting personal property from Oregonian decedents. Despite
concluding that no treaty or federal statute preempted the state law,
the Court held that the law was invalid because of its "direct impact
upon foreign relations."84 The Court reached this conclusion even
though the Executive Branch had informed the Court that the
" But cf. Bradley, 97 Mich L Rev at 442-43 (cited in note 70) (questioning the extent
to which state interests are protected in light of the Seventeenth Amendment, the rise of
executive agreements, the opaque nature of the treaty-making process, and the vagueness
of many of the treaty provisions that pose federalism issues).
'0 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 80 Tex L Rev
327 (2001).
For an argument along these lines, see Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev (cited in note 64).
82 See, e.g., Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 139 (cited in
note 62); Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and
Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry State
of Affairs? 26 Hastings Const L Q 307, 349-50 (1999); John Norton Moore, Federalism
and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke L J 248, 275-76.
83
4

389 US 429 (1968).
Id at 441.
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Oregon statute did not unduly interfere with foreign relations. 8s
The Court in Zschernig thus envisioned itself as having an independent role in policing, and invalidating, state foreign affairs activities.
Some commentators thought that a 1994 decision, BarclaysBank
v Franchise Tax Board, 6 might have spelled the end for dormant
foreign relations preemption. There, the Court held that a California system for taxing multinational corporations, which had generated substantial foreign protest and Executive Branch complaint,
did not unconstitutionally interfere with the ability of the national
government to speak with "one voice." The Court explained that
"[t]he Constitution does 'not make the judiciary the overseer of our
government,"' and that, as a result, the Court would "leave it to
Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to evaluate
whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or
state autonomy.

87

In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has latched onto a
different doctrine-"obstacle" preemption-to displace state foreign relations activities.88 In doing so, it has shown less tolerance
for such activities than one might have predicted after BarclaysBank.
Nevertheless, the Court has at the same time gone out of its way
not to endorse Zschernig. In American Insurance Association v Garamendi, for example, the majority referred to Zschernig only in the
passive voice, noting that "reliance [by the petitioners] is placed on
our decision in Zschernig v. Miller," and it declined to rest its finding
of preemption on the decision. 9 Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which
was joined by three other Justices, treated Zschernig with even less
enthusiasm, noting that, "[w]e have not relied on Zschernig since it
was decided, and I would not resurrect that decision here."9
The limiting function of the judicial power reflected in Sanchez" See id at 460 (Harlan, J, concurring).
.6

512 US 298 (1994).

17

Id at 330-31 (citations omitted).

" See American InsuranceAssociation v Garamendi,539 US 396 (2003); Crosby v National
Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
89539 US 396, 417 (2003). In a cryptic footnote, the majority suggested that dormant
preemption might be appropriate only when a state "take[s] a position on a matter of
foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility." Id
at 420 n 11. Under that approach, Zschernig was wrongly decided, since Oregon in that
case was legislating in the area of inheritance, a traditional state responsibility.
90 539 US at 439 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
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Llamas suggests that the Roberts Court may be even less enthusiastic
than the Rehnquist Court about dormant foreign relations preemption. Contrary to the approach in Zschernig, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas insisted that the "judicial function" did not give it a
supervisory role over state courts, even in cases affecting foreign
relations, and the Court at least suggested that federal preemption
of state law must be grounded in law that has been approved by
the federal political branches.
3. Domestic application of customary internationallaw. One of the
most controversial debates in foreign relations law in the last decade
has concerned the domestic status of customary international law.
Referred to historically as part of the "law of nations," customary
international law is the law of the international community that
"results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."9 1 Despite occasional
claims to the contrary, there now appears to be widespread agreement that, prior to Erie v Tompkins, customary international law
had the status in the United States of general common law. That
is, state and federal courts felt free to apply it in appropriate cases,
but they did not view it as supreme federal law that would either
preempt state law or provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction.
This approach fits well with the text of the Supremacy Clause, which
lists treaties, but not the law of nations, as preemptive federal law.
The post-Erie status of customary international law has generated
significant disagreement among academic commentators. Internationalist commentators claim that customary international law automatically has the status today of federal common law and thereby
preempts state law, serves as a source of federal question jurisdiction,
and potentially even overrides Executive Branch authority.92 Constitutionalist commentators, by contrast, have argued that customary international law has the status of federal common law only
when the political branches have authorized courts to incorporate
it as such.93 As with many foreign relations law debates, intermediate
positions have also arisen, with some commentators claiming that
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(1) (1987).
92 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of In-

ternationalLaw, 1994 Supreme Court Review 295; Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law
in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw
Really State Law? 110 Harv L Rev 1824 (1997).
"3See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as
FederalCommon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
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customary international law might be federal law only for jurisdictional purposes,94 or that customary international law might still
operate as general common law despite the holding in Erie that
"there is no more federal general common law."9
Customary international law comes up frequently in human rights
litigation brought under the Alien Tort Statute. This statute, first
enacted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, provides simply that
the federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."96 Ever since
97
the
the Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartigav Pena-Irala,
statute has become a fount of international human rights litigation-that is, suits by aliens against other aliens for human rights
abuses committed in other countries. Essentially all of these cases
have involved alleged violations of the "law of nations," or customary international law, rather than treaties, because the United States
has either not ratified the relevant human rights treaties or has
ratified them subject to non-self-execution declarations that render
them unenforceable in U.S. courts.
In allowing this litigation, the Filartigadecision and its progeny
embraced an internationalist conception of the role of the federal
courts. In explaining how Article md jurisdictional requirements
were satisfied in Filartiga despite the lack of a treaty or statutory
cause of action and the lack of diversity jurisdiction, the court there
invoked the judiciary's federal common law powers and cited to
"[t]
he Framers' overarching concern that control over international
affairs be vested in the new national government to safeguard the
standing of the United States among the nations of the world."98
The court concluded by describing its approach as "a small but
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all
" See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional
Perspective, 29 Pepperdine L Rev 187 (2001).
" See, e.g., Alexander Aleinikoff, InternationalLaw, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:Reflections on the Customary InternationalLaw Debate, 98 Am J Intl L 91 (2003);
Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 Va J Intl L
365 (2002).
96 28 USC § 1350.
97630

F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
" Id at 887. The court also incorrectly asserted that the law of nations "has always been
part of the federal common law." Id at 885.
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people from brutal violence."99 The author of the opinion, Judge
Irving Kaufman, extended this theme in a subsequent magazine
article commenting on the decision, writing that "the articulation
of evolved norms of international law by the courts" helps "form
the ethical foundations for a more enlightened social order."' ° In
other words, the court viewed its federal common law authority as
a means of effectuating the needs of the international system and
the court's views about the proper place of the United States in
that system.
The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain
was at least an initial step toward rejection of an internationalist
approach to the application of customary international law.' °' In
that case, the Court finally considered the propriety of using the
Alien Tort Statute as a vehicle for international human rights litigation. While the Court held that a "modest" number of such claims
could be pursued under the statute, the Court made clear that this
conclusion stemmed from congressional authorization, not some
independent judicial authority to effectuate international law. Thus,
while the Court concluded that the Alien Tort Statute "was meant
to underwrite litigation of a narrow set of common law actions
derived from the law of nations," it also made clear that there was
"no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations.""1 2 The Court further emphasized
that "the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law," and
that courts should be "wary of impinging on the discretion of the
03
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs."'
The limiting function of the judicial power embraced in SanchezLlamas suggests that the Roberts Court may move even further
toward the constitutionalist perspective on this issue. The Court
made clear in Sanchez-Llamas that to the extent that international
law (in that case, a treaty right) comes into the U.S. legal system,
it comes in subject to the usual remedial and procedural doctrines
governing the application of domestic law. In Sanchez-Llamas, those
99

Id at 890.
...
Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for InternationalTorture? NY Times Mag 44 (Nov
9, 1980).
1. 542 US 692 (2004).
2

11

Id at 721, 728.

103Id at 726, 727.
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doctrines included stare decisis, procedural default, and limits on
criminal law remedies. In the context of the customary international
law debate, the relevant limits are those applicable to post-Erie
federal common law, including most notably the requirement that
this law be derived from, and be consistent with, extant federal
law."° The judicial federalism aspects of Sanchez-Llamas, discussed
above, are also part of the limitations on post-Erie federal common
law that are potentially relevant to the domestic judicial incorporation of customary international law."°'
4. Scope of the "Charming Betsy" canon. There is a long-standing
canon of construction pursuant to which U.S. courts will attempt
to construe statutes, where reasonably possible, to avoid violations
of international law.10 6 A likely justification for the canon is that it
helps the United States avoid unintended violations of international
law by forcing the political branches to be clear when they intend
to violate it."°7 Internationalist commentators have attempted to
reshape the canon, however, so that it would become a vehicle for
expanding U.S. law to be aligned more closely to the contours of
international law, and for limiting the discretion of the political
branches.
An early example of this effort was an attempt to have courts
construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to disallow immunity for serious human rights violations, on the theory that there
was no right to such immunity under international law. The Act
specifically lists the grounds under which foreign sovereigns may
be denied immunity and does not have a provision for human rights
04 For

an extended argument to this effect, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith,

and David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of
Erie, 120 Harv L Rev 869 (2007).
10 Cf. Thomas W Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev
1, 15 (1985) ("[T]he federalism principle identified by Erie still exists but has been silently
transformed from a general constraint on the powers of the federal government into an
attenuated constraint that applies principally to one branch of that government-the federal judiciary.").
1 See Restatement (Third), § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to
be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement
of the United States.") (cited in note 91); Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch
64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.").
107See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 Georgetown L J 479 (1998). See also Einer
Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev 2162, 2238-41
(2002).
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violations." °8 Nevertheless, some judges and commentators argued
that the Act's provision for implied waiver of immunity should be
construed as extending to situations in which foreign states effectively "waived" their immunity internationally by engaging in egregious conduct.01 9 To date, all the circuit courts to consider this
argument have rejected it, reasoning that their obligation is to apply
the statute that Congress enacted, not mold it to the contours of
international law." 0 This is also arguably the subtext of the Supreme
Court's 1989 decision in Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., in which the Court rejected an Alien Tort Statute-based
exception to sovereign immunity."'
A more recent effort has concerned the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress enacted in the wake
of the September 11 attacks. The AUMF broadly authorizes the
Executive to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those
responsible for the attacks. Some commentators have argued, citing
to the Charming Betsy canon, that this authorization statute should
be read "consistently" with international law, such that it would
disallow interrogation and detention practices inconsistent with the
Geneva Conventions.1' 2 Used this way, the canon would become a
vehicle for judicial supervision of Executive Branch compliance with
international law, rather than a doctrine designed to promote political branch deliberation." 3 Courts have not yet shown an inclination to read the AUMF in this fashion. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld," 4
the Supreme Court construed the AUMF as authorizing the "incidents of war" and conditioned the exercise of that authority only
on compliance with constitutional requirements, not international
law. In Hamdan v Rumsfeld," the Court rejected the argument that
'

08

See 28 USC §§ 1602-11.

See, e.g., Princz v FederalRepublic of Germany, 26 F3d 1166, 1183-84 (DC Cir 1994)
(Wald, J, dissenting); Adam C. Belsky et al, Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of InternationalLaw, 77
Cal L Rev 365 (1989).
"' See, e.g., Sampson v Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F3d 1145 (7th Cir 2001).
...
See 488 US 428 (1989).
112See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 Am J Intl
L 337, 341 n 24 (2002); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 BC L Rev 93 (2005).
"' See Curtis A. Bradley andJack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 Harv L Rev 2047, 2098-99 (2005) (criticizing this use of the canon).
542 US 507 (2004).
...
126 S Ct 2749 (2006).
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the AUMF expanded President Bush's preexisting statutory authority to create military commissions, and it found that Congress
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice had imposed international
law restrictions on the use of military commissions, but the Court
did not rely on the Charming Betsy canon.
Perhaps the most dramatic effort to extend CharmingBetsy is with
respect to constitutional interpretation. A number of commentators
have argued that, just as with statutes, courts should construe the
Constitution to avoid violations of international law.116 It has been
argued, for example, that the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause should be interpreted to prohibit punishments disallowed under international law.117 This would involve
a substantial extension of the canon, since a narrower construction
of the Constitution in these instances would not actually place the
United States in violation of international law." 8 The Constitution
does not mandate particular punishments, for example, regardless
of how narrowly the Eighth Amendment is construed. Rather, such
punishments are mandated by federal and state law, and if those
laws are unambiguous there is no role for the Charming Betsy canon
of construction." 9 Indeed, the United States would not be in violation of international law even if it lacked an Eighth Amendment,
and even if it lacked a Constitution. It would violate international
law only if it imposed punishments that violated international standards.
More importantly, this extension of the Charming Betsy canon
calls upon the courts to use their interpretive power not to avoid
an unintended violation of international law, but rather to ensure
that the political branches do not violate international law or ac,16See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Use of InternationalSources in Constitutional Opinion,
32 Ga J Intl & Comp L 421, 427 (2004); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights
Law to Inform Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalyses, 52 U Cin L Rev 3, 36 (1983); Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary InternationalLaw Norms to the Death Penalty in the
United States, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp L 165, 179 (1995-96).
17 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 25 GaJ Intl & Comp L at 179 (cited in note 116).
1,8 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and InternationalLaw, 52 Duke L
J 485, 555-56 (2002) (explaining this point). See also Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in
the Debate on "OutsourcingAuthority," 69 Alb L Rev 653, 673-74 (2006) (criticizing efforts
to apply the Charming Betsy canon to the Constitution); John 0. McGinnis, Contemporary
Foreign and InternationalLaw in Constitutional Construction, 69 Alb L Rev 801, 803 n 4
(2006) (same).
19 Cf. Fundfor Animals, Inc. v Kempthorne, 472 F3d 872 (DC Cir 2006) (emphasizing
that the canon about avoiding international law violations applies only when a statute is
ambiguous).
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quiesce in a violation of international law by the states. Instead of
reserving the issue of international law compliance to the political
branches, this approach attempts to take the issue away from the
political process by constitutionalizing it.'

These efforts to expand the Charming Betsy canon to give courts
a more affirmative role in aligning U.S. law with international law,
and overseeing political branch compliance with international law,
are at odds with the limited judicial role envisioned in SanchezLlamas. The Court there carefully restricted itself to the bounds of
the particular treaty provision in question, and disclaimed independent remedial authority to help effectuate enforcement of the
provision, even when such authority would align the United States
more closely to the position of an international tribunal. As the
Court explained, "our authority to create a judicial remedy appli'
cable in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself." '
B.

THE JUDICIAL POWER AS PROTECTION

The protective function of the judicial power envisioned in Sanchez-Llamas also has potential implications for U.S. foreign relations law. Most notably, it suggests that regardless of whether the
nondelegation doctrine has vitality in the international arena, there
are limits on the extent to which the federal judicial power may
be delegated to international institutions. These limits, as I will
explain, are likely to be enforced most commonly through a presumption that the decisions and orders of international institutions
are "non-self-executing" in the U.S. legal system. I also consider
here the potential relevance of these limitations for the Supreme
Court's citation of foreign and international materials in its constitutional interpretation decisions.
1. Limits on adjudicative delegations. There is a growing debate
over whether the Constitution limits the extent to which the
United States can delegate authority to international institutions.'22 A central issue in this debate is the proper analogy. If
"0 As explained in subsection B, the Supreme Court's controversial citation of foreign
and

international

materials

in

recent

constitutional

interpretation

decisions

is

distinguishable.
'2' 126

S Ct at 2679.

122 Compare, for example, Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International

Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 Minn L Rev 71 (2000), with David
Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
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delegations of authority to international institutions are properly
analogized to delegations of authority from Congress to U.S. administrative agencies, they may seem unproblematic, given the
weakness of the nondelegation doctrine in the administrative
agency context. The nondelegation doctrine has been applied to
invalidate legislative delegations in only two cases, both decided
in 1935, and the doctrine has often been described as having little
if any modern vitality. Moreover, Supreme Court precedent suggests that, if anything, there are even fewer restraints on congressional delegations to the Executive in the area of foreign affairs.' 23
On the other hand, it is not clear that this is the proper analogy,
since, unlike the Executive, international institutions have no direct electoral connection to U.S. voters. Moreover, international
institutions are not subject to the public notice and comment, and
congressional oversight, applicable to U.S. administrative agencies. An alternative analogy would be to delegations of governmental authority to private actors, which, although often allowed,
are probably subject to greater constitutional restraints than delegations to the Executive.12 4
Most of the focus in this debate has been on legislative and
regulatory delegations. Whatever the outcome of that debate, Sanchez-Llamas suggests that, at the very least, nondelegation concerns
will have force in the context of international adjudicative delegations. In considering the weight to be given to the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Court in
Sanchez-Llamas noted that Article III of the Constitution vests the
judicial power in the federal courts, and that this power extends
to the interpretation of treaties. As a result, the Court reasoned,
"If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal
system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law 'is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,'
headed by the 'one supreme Court' established by the ConstituAuthority, 55 Stan L Rev 1697 (2003). See also Edward Swaine, The Constitutionality of
InternationalDelegations, 104 Colum L Rev 1492 (2004).
121 See, e.g., United States v Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 US 304, 315 (1936). But
cf. NRDC v EPA, 464 F3d 1, 9 (DC Cir 2006) (concluding that, if certain regulatory
decisions made by the parties to the Montreal Protocol constituted binding law, it "would
raise serious constitutional questions in light of the nondelegation doctrine, numerous
constitutional procedural requirements for making law, and the separation of powers").
' I develop this analogy further in a forthcoming article, ConstitutionalProcess, Treaty
Amendments, andAccountability, which will be published in Law & Contemporary Problems.
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tion."'2 5 The Court therefore resisted the conclusion that the President and Senate had delegated to the ICJ the authority to bind
federal courts to its treaty interpretations.
There are a number of reasons why nondelegation concerns are
likely to be given weight in the adjudicative context even if courts
do not scrutinize other types of international delegations. First,
whereas delegations of legislative or regulatory authority involve
voluntary transfers of authority from the branches of government
that would normally exercise that authority, with adjudicative delegations the political branches are delegating another branch's
(i.e., the judiciary's) authority. Arguments about institutional consent and accountability for the initial delegation are therefore less
applicable here.126
Second, the case law concerning limits on delegations to nonArticle III tribunals, while hardly determinate, is more substantial
than the case law for the nondelegation doctrine. Article III nondelegation concerns led the Supreme Court to invalidate the bankruptcy court system established by Congress in the early 1980s,' 27
and, in upholding adjudicative delegations in other modern cases,
the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the existence of limits on the
extent to which adjudicative authority can be vested in non-Article
III tribunals.' 28 Moreover, in other decisions that do not involve
delegations per se, the Court has shown a willingness to guard
the Article III judicial power from erosion. 1 9 There is also longstanding precedent to draw upon, including Hayburn's Case (which
.2 126 S Ct at 2684.
526 Cf. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interringthe Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U
Chi L Rev 1721 (2002) (relying on such arguments in questioning the nondelegation
doctrine); see also id at 1755 ("Congress couldn't, for example, transfer to executive agents
a power that the Constitution vests in some other institution, such as the Supreme Court.").
For a similar reason, one could question the ability of the Senate and President to delegate,
through a treaty, the full Congress's authority to determine whether the United States
should go to war (assuming it has such authority). See Curtis A. Bradley, International
Delegations, the StructuralConstitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan L Rev 1557, 1569-70
(2003).
527 See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982).
520 See, e.g., Peretz v United States, 501 US 923, 936-39 (1991); Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 847-56 (1986); Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 US 568, 582-89 (1985).
129See, e.g., Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US 211,218-19 (1995) (holding that it
was unconstitutional for Congress to retroactively reopen final judgments by Article II
courts because doing so interfered with the power of the federal judiciary "'to render
dispositive judgments."') (quoting Frank Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 Case W L
Rev 905, 926 (1990)).
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has come to stand for the proposition that Congress generally
cannot vest the review of decisions of Article III courts in the
Executive Branch),13 ° and United States v Klein (which, although
its holding is not very clear, may limit the ability of Congress to
determine how federal courts adjudicate a case).' 3 1 Ex parte Milligan, the famous Civil War-era decision disallowing the trial of
a U.S. citizen by military commission (and much discussed in
connection with the current war on terrorism), was also premised
in part on Article III nondelegation concerns.' 3 2 Scholarly commentary on the issue, while divided with respect to the proper
organizing principle, does not evidence the same wholesale retreat
as is the case with respect to the administrative nondelegation
doctrine. 3' 3
Finally, as a predictive matter, one can expect that the federal
courts will be more solicitous in preventing the loss of their own
authority than that of the other branches.' 3 4 In other modern contexts, the Supreme Court has resisted what it has perceived as
political branch challenges to its judicial authority. 3 ' The latest
indication of this is of course Sanchez-Llamas itself. The Court's
approach in Sanchez-Llamas was foreshadowed in the earlier Breard
decision, in which the Court emphasized that, notwithstanding a
130See 2 Dall 409 (1792). See also Miller v French, 530 US 327, 343 (2000) (describing
Hayburn's Case).
...
See 13 Wall 128, 146 (1872) (suggesting that Congress may not "prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it"). But
cf. Plant, 514 US at 218 ("Whatever the precise scope of Klein . . . later decisions have
made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amend[s] applicable
law."') (citation omitted).
112See 4 Wall 2, 121 (1866) ("Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and
from what source did the military commission that tried him derive their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on them; because the
Constitution expressly vests it 'in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,' and it is not pretended that the
commission was a court ordained and established by Congress.").
...
See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,Article III Courts, and the JudicialPower
of the United States, 118 Harv L Rev 643, 647-48 (2004) (describing academic theories).
'4 As lifetime appointees generally removed from party politics, Supreme CourtJustices
are more likely to be protective of institutional interests than members of Congress. Cf.
Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,Not Powers, 119 Harv L
Rev 2311 (2006) (arguing that members of Congress are unlikely to be institutionally
protective, especially when Congress is controlled by the President's party).
115See, e.g., Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 536 (1997) ("When the political branches of
the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare
decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.").
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provisional order from the ICJ calling for a stay of execution, "this
Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis of law."' 36
The Hamdan decision, decided a day after Sanchez-Llamas, also
fits this pattern, since the Court there emphasized the ultimate
authority of the federal courts to interpret the relevant law.'37
2. Presuming non-self-execution. None of this is to suggest that
delegations of adjudicative authority to international institutions
are inherently problematic, or that the Supreme Court will impose
significant constitutional restraints on the ability of the United
States to agree to such delegations. The United States has agreed
to have international arbitral tribunals resolve treaty disputes since
the early days of the nation, so some assignment of adjudicative
authority to international actors is certainly allowed. Moreover,
the Court's current standard for determining whether delegations
to non-Article III tribunals are permissible is highly contextual
and indeterminate,' 38 and, especially in the international context,
may require judgments for which the courts lack sufficient expertise. In addition, a central factor considered by the Courtwhether the dispute in question concerns "public rights" (e.g., civil
disputes between the government and private parties that historically could have been determined exclusively by the government)-may often weigh in favor of the permissibility of international delegations.' 39
"' 523 US at 378. See also Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalismof Free Nations, 28 NYU
J Intl L & Pol 35, 36-42 (1995-96) (raising the possibility that the vesting of decisionmaking authority in international tribunals would violate Article III).
...
See 126 S Ct at 2775 ("Together, [federal statutes] at most acknowledge a general
Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances where justified
under the 'Constitution and laws,' including the law of war. Absent a more specific congressional authorization, the task of this Court is. . .to decide whether Hamdan's military
commission is so justified.").
"' In evaluating whether such a delegation is permissible, the Supreme Court considers,
among other things, "the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range
of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III." Schor, 478 US at 851. The Court's ultimate functional inquiry is whether the delegation "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch." Id.
"' This may be what saves the NAFTA Chapter 19 arbitral panels, which review whether
a U.S. administrative agency has correctly applied U.S. law in making certain import
decisions. See Ethan Boyer, Article III, The Foreign Relations Power,and the BinationalPanel
System of NAFTA, 13 Intl Tax and Bus Lawyer 101 (1996). Cf. Matthew Burton, Note,
Assigning the JudicialPower to InternationalTribunals: NAFTA BinationalPanels and Foreign
Affairs Flexibility, 88 Va L Rev 1529 (2002) (defending the constitutionality of the tribunals
based on the special need for flexibility in foreign affairs).
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Because of the doctrinal uncertainties and difficulties of judicial
line-drawing in this context, it is likely that Article III nondelegation concerns will be addressed most commonly through interpretive canons. Indeed, in domestic cases, the Court already uses
the constitutional avoidance canon as a means of giving effect to
Article III nondelegation concerns. In Gomez v United States,4 °
for example, the Court construed the Federal Magistrates Act as
not authorizing felony jury trial selection by magistrates, noting,
"It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal
statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.""14
Importantly, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas did not suggest that
the United States' delegation of judicial authority to the ICJ to
resolve disputes under the Vienna Convention (through the Optional Protocol) was constitutionally problematic. The Court's Article III concern, rather, related to the domestic effect of the ICJ
decision-the determination of the meaning of treaties "as a matter of federal law."' 4 2 As I have argued elsewhere, courts can generally address this concern by presuming that the decisions of
international adjudicative institutions are "non-self-executing" in
the U.S. legal system-that is, that they do not by themselves
create a rule of decision for U.S. courts.'43 By requiring political
branch implementation, this presumption subjects international
decisions to the filter of the U.S. democratic process, while preserving the traditional role of the federal courts to interpret and
apply existing domestic law.
The D.C. Circuit has applied this non-self-execution approach
in a number of cases involving the orders and decisions of international institutions. In Diggs v Richardson, the court concluded
that a Security Council resolution prohibiting certain contacts
with apartheid South Africa did not "confer on individual citizens
rights that are judicially enforceable in American domestic
140490

US 858 (1989).

141
Id at 864. More controversially, the Court also uses this interpretive approach to

address constitutional concerns associated with delegations from Congress to administrative agencies. See John E Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance,
2000 Supreme Court Review 223; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L
Rev 315 (2000).
142 126 S Ct at 2684.
14See generally Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1587-95 (cited in note 126).
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courts."'" Similarly, in Committee of United States Citizens Living
in Nicaragua v Reagan,145 the court reasoned that an ICJ decision
prohibiting the United States from assisting rebel forces in Nicaragua was non-self-executing because the relevant treaty provisions evidenced "no intent to vest citizens who reside in a U.N.
member nation with authority to enforce an ICJ decision against
their own government. ' Most recently, in NRDC v EPA, 47 the
court held that decisions of the parties under the Montreal Protocol did not have the status of "judicially enforceable domestic
law," reasoning that such status would raise "significant constitutional problems." '48
3. Citation offoreign and internationalmaterials. The Court's resistance in Sanchez-Llamas to giving substantial weight to the ICJ's
reasoning might be contrasted with recent decisions in which the
Court has cited foreign and international materials in resolving
issues of constitutional interpretation.' 4 9 This practice has generated significant controversy, both in the academy and among
5 Internationalist commentators point to the pracpolicymakers."'
tice as evidence that the Supreme Court is moving to a more global
conception of its role. 5 '
This practice has been vigorously opposed by some Supreme
Court Justices,'52 and it is possible that the practice will diminish
with the new appointments to the Court. "' In any event, this
practice is distinguishable from efforts to give direct effect to in" See 555 F2d 848, 851 (DC Cir 1976).
859 F2d 929 (DC Cir 1988).
146 Id at 938.
.45

464 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2006).
Id at 9. The court also suggested more broadly that the decisions were mere political
commitments rather than binding international obligations.
"9 See, e.g., Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005); Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 572-73
(2003); Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 316 n 21 (2002).
IS' Compare, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law,
98 Am J Intl L 43 (2004), with John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw
U L Rev (2006).
147
141

...
See, e.g., Melissa 'Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
JudicialDialogue in Creatingand EnforcingInternationalLaw, 93 Georgetown LJ 487 (2005).
'52
See, e.g., Roper, 543 US at 622-28 (Scalia, J, dissenting, along with Rehnquist and
Thomas).
113 In their confirmation hearings, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito suggested
skepticism about reliance on foreign and international materials in constitutional interpretation. There may still be five Justices, however, that support such reliance.
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ternational adjudicatory decisions. The Court has treated foreign
and international materials as evidence that may be relevant to the
interpretation of vague or uncertain constitutional provisions, not
as sources of law that have direct and binding application in the
U.S. legal system. Nor has it purported to use these materials in
a Charming Betsy sort of way-that is, the Court has not claimed
that the Constitution must be interpreted to avoid being inconsistent with these materials. Even in the Court's broadest endorsement of the practice-in the juvenile death penalty decision,
Roper v Simmons-the Court made clear that, although the opinion
of the world community may provide "respected and significant
confirmation" for the Court's conclusions, it is "not control' This phrasing is similar to the "respectful consideration"
ling."154
that the Court in Sanchez-Llamas gave to the ICJ's reasoning.
Thus, as currently applied by the Court, the citation of foreign
and international materials is not a threat to the Article III judicial
power. The foreign and international materials are subject to discretionary selection by the Court, and are treated as nonbinding.
This practice is in fact best viewed as potentially enhancingjudicial
discretion by giving the Court a broader array of materials to draw
from in rationalizing its constitutional interpretations. Regardless
of whether this practice is a proper method of constitutional interpretation, it is not likely to erode the authority of the federal
courts.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCING THE PRESIDENT'S MEMORANDUM

Because the petitioners in Sanchez-Llamas were not part of the
group of fifty-one Mexican nationals directly covered by the ICJ's
judgment in Avena, the Court did not need to consider the legal
status or effect of President Bush's February 2005 memorandum,
in which he stated that the United States would give effect to the
ICJ's judgment in its state courts. The Court simply noted in
passing that "the United States has agreed to 'discharge its international obligations' in having state courts give effect to the decision in Avena.'

1' 55

During the prior Term, the Court had before it a case that did
15' 543 US at 578.
155126 S Ct at 2685.
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involve one of the fifty-one Mexican nationals, Medellin v Dretke.S6
The Court initially granted a writ of certiorari in that case, but
subsequently dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. A principal reason for the dismissal was the possibility that Medellin
might obtain the relief he was seeking in7 a Texas state court, as a
5
result of the President's memorandum.'
After Sanchez-Llamas, however, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied relief to Medellin, holding that the President's
158
memorandum did not override Texas's law of procedural default.
In reaching this conclusion, the Texas court noted that the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas had concluded that Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention does not override state rules of procedural
default, and that the ICJ's reasoning in Avena is not binding on
U.S. courts. As a result, the Texas court concluded that neither
Article 36 nor the Avena judgment created a legal basis for overriding Texas's law. With respect to the President's memorandum,
the court, invoking the Youngstown steel seizure decision, reasoned
that the President lacked the power to create preemptive federal
law, and that the memorandum improperly "intrud[ed] into the
1' 59
independent powers of the judiciary.
The implications of Sanchez-Llamas for the enforceability of the
President's memorandum are less clear than this analysis suggests.
As an initial matter, Sanchez-Llamas did not consider the effect of
the ICJ's judgment, as opposed to its reasoning. It would not be
illogical for the Court to both disagree with the ICJ's reasoning,
as it did in Sanchez-Llamas, and nevertheless enforce the ICJ's
judgment, just as U.S. courts often enforce foreign court judgments and commercial arbitral awards without endorsing their
underlying reasoning. To be sure, ICJ judgments may be distinguishable in this regard given the interstate nature of ICJ dispute
resolution and the subject matter of the disputes addressed by the
ICJ, 6 ° but the Court in Sanchez-Llamas did not address that issue.
More fundamentally, Sanchez-Llamas is ultimately a decision
156See

544 US 660 (2005).

Id at 666-67; see also id at 669 (Ginsburg, J, concurring).
s See Exparte Medellin, 2006 Tex Crim App LEXIS 2236 (Tex Ct Crim App, Nov 15,
2006).
' Id at *45.
161See Curtis A. Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 119 (2006); Mark L. Movsesian, UnderstandingSanchez-Llamas (draft on file with
author).
's
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about judicial power, not Executive power. The Court made clear
in Sanchez-Llamas that the judiciary lacks the authority to create
remedies or legal rules that go beyond the terms of a treaty, even
for the sake of facilitating enforcement of the treaty. While the
Court also suggested that the judiciary should be protected from
outside control, its focus was on control by non-U.S. actors, not
the Executive. Indeed, the Court noted that U.S. courts should
give deference to Executive Branch treaty constructions.16 1
The decision in Sanchez-Llamas therefore does not preclude the
possibility that the Executive has some remedial lawmaking authority in this context not possessed by the judiciary, perhaps stemming from the President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed." 6' 2 Even though Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention may not override state procedural default rules (as
both the Executive and the Supreme Court have now concluded),
the United States still has a treaty obligation to comply with the
ICJ's judgment, pursuant to Article 94 of the United Nations
Charter. 63 While Article 94 is almost certainly non-self-executing-that is, it does not of its own force give domestic effect to
ICJ judgments164-the President's Take Care authority may include some ability to give legal effect to a non-self-executing treaty
obligation. Or, to put it slightly differently, Article 94 could be
read as implicitly delegating to the Executive Branch some authority to implement ICJ decisions, in the same way that foreign
affairs statutes are often construed as implicitly delegating authority to the Executive.' 6 5
Certainly there must be limits on the authority of the President
to create preemptive federal law, even in the area of foreign relations. Dicta in American Insurance Association v Garamendi sugSee 126 S Ct at 2685.
"6'US Const, Art II, § 3.
163 See UN Charter, Art 94(1) ("Each member of the United Nations undertakes to
161

comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is
a party.").
"6See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaraguav Reagan, 859 F2d 929,
937-38 (DC Cir 1988); A. Mark Weisburd, InternationalJudicial Decisions, Domestic Courts,
and the ForeignAffairs Power, 2004-05 Cato Sup Ct Rev 287, 299-304. The only enforcement mechanism mentioned in Article 94 is through the UN Security Council. See UN
Charter, Art 94(2).
65 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va L Rev 649, 670-71
(2000); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with
ICJ Orders of ProvisionalMeasures, 92 Am J Intl L 683, 689 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95 2006

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

96

[2006

gesting that state law can be preempted by the "foreign policy of
' has been appropriately criticized.'6 7 The
the Executive Branch"166
Supreme Court would not need to go as far as that dicta, however,
to enforce the President's memorandum, since the underlying
treaty commitment to comply with the ICJ's judgment makes compliance more than simply the foreign policy of the Executive
Branch. Indeed, the Texas court acknowledged that the President
might be able to accomplish this by entering into an executive
agreement with Mexico.' 6 8 If this is the case (and there may be
federalism and other grounds for disputing it), it is not clear why
the lack of this formality is dispositive.169 While requiring an executive agreement would impose a process restraint on the Executive's ability to preempt state law, such a restraint is not (unlike
the Article II treaty process, which involves the Senate) one that
has any particular relationship to the protection of state interests.
III.

BENEFITS OF THE JUDICIAL

POWER'S Two FUNCTIONS

IN

INTERNATIONAL CASES

The constitutionalist approach, as reflected in Sanchez-Llamas, envisions federal judges as agents of the domestic legal system,
not the international order. This part outlines several benefits
associated with this approach in light of the current nature of the
international adjudicative system. In particular, it argues that the
constitutionalist approach has the virtues of enhancing democratic
input, compensating for the lack of horizontal checks and balances
at the international level, allowing international law and decisions
to be tailored to local conditions, and facilitating local acceptance
of international decision making. It also argues that countervailing
arguments about the need for the uniformity and the desirability
of enhancing international law compliance are weak in this context.
166539 US at 413.

167See Brannon P. Denning and Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in ForeignAffairs, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 825 (2004);
Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in ForeignAffairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA
L Rev 309 (2006).
161 See 2006 Tex Crim App LEXIS at *66-*67.
16' But see Weisburd, 2004-05 Cato Sup Ct Rev at 313 (cited in note 164) ("Since the
president's power to supersede state law in foreign affairs matters derives from his authority
to bargain with foreign governments, the absence of a bargain eliminates any basis for
presidential authority.").
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THE INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE "SYSTEM"

Since World War II and the establishment of the United
Nations, there has been a vast growth in the number and types
of international institutions. As part of this growth, scores of adjudicative institutions have arisen, sometimes as stand-alone bodies, but often as constituent parts of broader organizations." 0
There are general tribunals like the ICJ; specialized tribunals in
areas such as trade, human rights, and the law of the sea; ad hoc
arbitral bodies such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; regional
tribunals such as in Europe and in the Inter-American system; and
criminal tribunals, including the relatively new International
Criminal Court (ICC).' 7 ' Increasingly, in terms of the subject matters that they address and the ways in which they are structured,
international adjudicatory institutions are resembling traditional
domestic courts rather than simply interstate arbitral mechanisms.
Although not a party to all of these institutions (such as the ICC),
the United States has connections to many of them.
This description actually understates the extent of, and variations within, the international adjudicative "system." In part because separation of powers is less distinct in the international system than in some domestic systems, many international
institutions that are not courts or tribunals nevertheless perform
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The Security Council, for example, routinely decides whether nations have acted in ways that
threaten international peace and security.172 Monitoring and in-

spection committees for human rights and arms control regimes
regularly issue reports or decisions concerning compliance.' 73 The
7 See generally Julian G. Ku, InternationalDelegations and the New World Court Order,
81 Wash L Rev 1, 25-31 (2006); Martinez, 56 Stan L Rev at 436-41 (cited in note 2);
Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferationof InternationalJudicial Bodies: The Pieces of the
Puzzle, 31 Intl L and Pol 709 (1999).
"' For a chart showing 125 international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and mechanisms, see The Project on International Courts and Tribunals-Synoptic Chart, version 3.0
(Nov 2004), at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic-chart/Synop-C4.pdf.
172See, e.g., U-N Security Council, Res 1718 (Oct 14, 2006) (concluding that nuclear

test by North Korea created a threat to international peace and security and therefore
imposing a variety of sanctions).
,' See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States
of America, UN Doc A/50/40, para 279 (expressing the view that U.S. reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including a reservation concerning
the use of the death penalty for individuals who committed crimes while under the age
of eighteen, were invalid because they were incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Covenant); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24(52), General Comment
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same is true of various international law "commissions," such as
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which, although not constituted as a court, has issued a variety of adjudicatory rulings, including some relating to U.S. practices such as
the death penalty.'74 "Conferences of parties" established under
treaty regimes also frequently issue quasi-judicial "decisions"
about how the treaty should be interpreted or applied.' 75
There are wide variations in the jurisdiction of these various
institutions. Some, like the ICJ, can hear disputes only between
nation-states. Others, like the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights, are open to disputes between states and private parties.
Moreover, different states often have differing jurisdictional relationships with the same institution. For example, some states
may accept a tribunal's general or compulsory jurisdiction, whereas
others may not. For the ICJ, sixty-six states currently accept its
compulsory jurisdiction, which is only about one-third of all the
members of the United Nations, and many of those sixty-six states
have qualified their acceptance of this jurisdiction with reservations.'7 6 Similarly, some parties to a treaty may consent to adjudication with respect to disputes that arise under the treaty, while
other parties to the treaty may not. For the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, for example, there are 171 parties to the
treaty, but only forty-five of them currently accept ICJ jurisdiction
to resolve disputes under the treaty.'7 7 In addition, some states
on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant
or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of
the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR C/21/Rev 1/Add 6 (1994) (expressing views about the
circumstances under which reservations to the Covenant are disallowed, and stating that
"[i]t necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is
compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant").
' See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 62/02, Case
12.285, Michael Domingues, United States (Oct 22, 2002) (concluding that customary
international law prohibits the execution of individuals who commit their crimes prior to
the age of eighteen).
1' For example, decisions by the conference of parties under the Montreal Protocol
were at issue in the NRDC case described in note 123.
76See Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, at http:
//www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm.
The United
States was originally a party to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, but withdrew from that
jurisdiction after the ICJ assumed jurisdiction over a case in the 1980s concerning U.S.
military activities in Nicaragua. Only one of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council-Great Britain-is currently a party to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction,
and its consent to that jurisdiction is subject to the proviso that it can "at any time . ..
and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either add to, amend or withdraw"
any of its reservations to the jurisdiction.
"' See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org.
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may allow their citizens to file individual complaints with an institution, whereas others may not. This is optional, for example,
with the Human Rights Committee that administers the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'78
Sometimes, even when the relevant parties to a controversy have
not agreed to an institution's jurisdiction, the institution will nevertheless address the controversy through the issuance of an advisory opinion. The ICJ has done this on a number of occasions,
perhaps most controversially when it opined in 2004 about the
legality of Israel's construction of a security barrier in occupied
Palestine.' 79 Although the United States is not a party to the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights, that Court has issued a number
of advisory opinions relating to practices in the United States,
including U.S. compliance with the Vienna Convention.' These
advisory opinions are technically not "binding" under international law, although the line between binding and nonbinding
international decisions is often unclear in light of the limited enforcement options associated with even binding decisions, as well
as the possibility that nonbinding decisions will either be given
substantial deference or treated as evidence of binding customary
international law.
The jurisdiction of these various institutions frequently overlaps, such that different institutions may address the same questions and potentially reach different conclusions, and there is no
established hierarchy among these institutions."' For example, as
noted above, both the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
and the ICJ have addressed issues of compliance with the Vienna
"' See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 302, entered into force March 23, 1976.
179See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (July 9, 2004), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imwp/imwpframe.htm. For criticism of the ICJ's exercise of advisory jurisdiction in this
case, see Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdictionand the Crumbling Wall Between
the Politicaland the judicial, 99 Am J Intl L 26 (2005).
1"'See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, "The Right to Information on
Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guaranties of the Due Process of Law," Adv
Op OC-16/99, Inter-Am Ct HR (Set A) No 16 (Oct 1, 1999).
"' See generally Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictionsof InternationalCourts and Tribunals (2003); see also Martinez, 56 Stan L Rev at 431 ("In many situations . . . it is as
yet unclear what should happen when more than one court potentially has jurisdiction
over the same case; unclear how one court should treat the decisions of another court;
and unclear what should happen when courts reach inconsistent decisions.") (cited in note
2).
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Convention, and they have expressed differing views about what
the treaty requires.' 82 Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has expressed views contrary to the
ICJ concerning state responsibility for the actions of non-actors.18 3
The jurisdiction of international adjudicatory institutions also
increasingly overlaps with the jurisdiction of domestic courts.184
As its Vienna Convention decisions demonstrate, the ICJ is now
addressing issues of domestic criminal law and procedure. International criminal tribunals address crimes that may also be addressed in domestic criminal law. A particularly direct intersection
between international adjudication and domestic courts was evident in two NAFTA arbitral cases, Loewen and Mondev, in which
NAFTA panels considered whether state court decision making
in the United States had violated U.S. treaty obligations.'
The appointment process for the members of these institutions
varies widely, with none of them appointed with the tenure and
salary protections applicable to federal judges. Nor are these appointments typically subject to nearly as much transparency or
public deliberation as with domestic judicial appointments.18 6 Consider, for example, the ICJ. It consists of fifteen judges, from fifteen
different nations. These judges are, according to the ICJ Statute,
"2 Whereas the Inter-American Court expressed the view that consular notice must be
provided "at the time the accused is deprived of his freedom, or at least before he makes
his first statement before the authorities," see Inter-American Court, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, at para 106 (cited in note 180), the ICJ in Avena
expressed the view that the notice should be given "as soon as it is realized that the person
is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a
foreign national" and that the notice need not necessarily be given at the time of the
arrest or before questioning, see Case Concerning Avena, at paras 87-88 (cited in note 20).
"' Compare Case Concerning the Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragna (Nicaragua v United States ofAmerica), 1986 ICJ 14, para 115 (1986) (Judgment of
27 June 1986) (adopting narrow "effective control" standard for attribution of private
conduct to states), with The Prosecutorv Dusko Tadic, IT-94- 1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
para 145 (1999) (Judgment of 15 July 1999) (Merits) (adopting broader "overall control"
standard).
...
See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a GlobalizingJudicialSystem, 54 Duke
LJ 1143 (2005).
185See The Loewen Group, Inc. v UnitedStates ofAmerica, Case No ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award)
(June 26, 2003), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf; Mondev Int'l
Ltd v United States of America, Case No ARB(AF)/99/2 (Award) (Oct 11, 2002), at http:/
/www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
.86
See Ruth Mackenzie and Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44 Harv Intl L J 271, 277-78 (2003) ("In practice,
the nomination and election of judges to international courts and tribunals are politicized
processes, subject to little transparency, and to widely varying nomination mechanisms at
the national level.").
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supposed to be representative of the "main forms of civilization"
and "the principal legal systems of the world."' 87 The ICJ's membership has in fact been quite varied, although the five veto members of the Security Council have almost always had a judge on
the court. (The current judges on the court are from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Jordan, Madagascar, China, Sierra
Leone, Venezuela, Japan, Germany, Slovakia, France, New Zealand, Mexico, Morocco, and Russia.) The judges are nominated
by "national groups" in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (which
are appointed by each nation), and then elected by the UN General
Assembly and UN Security Council. These judges serve for nineyear terms and can be reelected. When a judge is elected or reelected to the ICJ, even when it is a U.S. judge, there is almost
no public attention or debate in the United States.' 8 8
In many instances, the judges on international adjudicative bodies are likely to be "biased" in the sense that they will vote according to the preferences of their nation. One study of the ICJ,
for example, found that ICJ judges vote for their home state about
90 percent of the time, and when their home state is not a party,
they tend to vote for states that are similar to their home state in
terms of wealth, culture, and political regime. 8 9 This is unsurprising, given that these judges are as a practical matter dependent
on their nations for reappointment, and also potentially for other
government positions.' 9" As further noted by Eric Posner and Miguel Figueiredo, "These considerations are likely to weigh even
more heavily in the calculations of judges from authoritarian states,
as these judges do not necessarily have the option to take refuge
in the private sector if they displease their government. ' ' Even
without such incentives, however, it is not surprising that judges
ICJ Statute, Art 9.
8 Based on a LexisNexis search of major newspapers, I could find no mention in U.S.
newspapers of the reelection to the ICJ in 2005 of the current American judge, Thomas
Buergenthal. Contrast that with the news coverage of the recent appointments of John
Roberts and Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court.
' See Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice
Biased? 34J Legal Stud 539 (2005).
'0 For debate over whether judicial independence is desirable in international tribunals,
compare Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in International Tribunals,
93 Cal L Rev 1 (2005) (arguing that it is not), with Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to ProfessorsPosner and Yoo,
93 Cal L Rev 899 (2005) (arguing that it is).
"' Posner and Figueiredo, 34J Legal Stud at 608 (cited in note 189).
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would reflect the particular perspectives of their nations, which
might be very different from the perspective of the party countries
before them.
In sum, the international adjudicative system is highly varied
and fragmented. It has scores of institutions of varying levels of
specialization and types of jurisdiction, with often varying relationships to different states. It produces overlapping and sometimes conflicting decisions, some of which are formally binding
and some of which are not, and some of which will reflect national
biases.
Contrast this with the U.S. Supreme Court and its relationship
to U.S. states. There is one centralized Supreme Court, and it has
a hierarchical relationship to both the lower federal courts and,
for issues of federal law, to the state courts. It applies law that is
expressly stated in the Constitution to be part of the supreme law
of the land and binding on state judges. Its judges are appointed
from the U.S. bar in a process that involves substantial public
attention and requires nomination by a nationally elected president
and approval by a substantial number of senators, two of whom
represent each state. The judges then enjoy lifetime tenure and
salary protection. The judges may well be "political" in the sense
that their votes are affected by their political preferences, but they
are largely removed from direct political influences. In practice,
the constitutional decisions of the Court nevertheless hew pretty
closely to democratic preferences of the polity. As for its nonconstitutional decisions, they are subject to override by a simple
majority of the legislative branch. The Court decides only cases
and controversies and will not issue advisory opinions. It now has
well over 200 years of history and jurisprudence from which to
draw. Perhaps most importantly, it is understood to be the national
court for a single country of which the states are constituent parts.
Even with all of this, its decisions and authority have sometimes
been vigorously questioned, both by the states and by the federal
political branches.
The only international adjudicatory institutions that bear some
resemblance to the U.S. Supreme Court are two supranational
courts in Europe-the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights. These institutions are centralized
tribunals, embedded in a connected geographic community that
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shares a common drive for integration.'9 2 They have broad compulsory jurisdiction that is similar for all the member states, and
they have now developed an extensive jurisprudence. Not coincidentally, national court relations with those institutions come
closest to the internationalist approach, with national courts generally treating the decisions of those institutions as authoritative.19 3
The United States is of course not a party to these institutions,
and they are not representative of the rest of the international
adjudicative system.
B.

BENEFITS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH

In light of the current state of the international adjudicative
system, there are a number of benefits to the constitutionalist
approach followed in Sanchez-Llamas: enhancing democratic input,
helping to compensate for the lack of horizontal checks and balances at the international level, ensuring that international decision making is tailored to local conditions, and facilitating domestic acceptance of such decision making.
First, by limiting judicial remedial creativity and denying international decisions direct domestic effect, the constitutionalist
approach enhances democratic input in the domestic application
and enforcement of international law. Under this approach, decisions about whether and how to comply with international law
are made in the first instance by the democratically accountable
political branches, rather than the courts. Such a democratic "filter" is particularly important for international law because the
processes of international lawmaking-both treaty-based and customary-are less transparent and involve less accountability than
domestic democratic lawmaking.194
92The European Court of Justice is the adjudicatory body of the European Union,

which now has twenty-seven member states. The European Court of Human Rights is
part of the Council of Europe, which has forty-six member states. All members of the
European Union are also members of the Council of Europe.
"' Even for those courts, there are mediating doctrines that can limit the intrusiveness
of the courts on national decision making, such as the "margin of appreciation" and
"subsidiarity." See, e.g., Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (1996); George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Union and the United States, 94 Colum L
Rev 331 (1994).
114See generally John 0. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should InternationalLaw Be Partof
Our Law? 59 Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2007); Eric Stein, International Integration and
Democracy: No Love atFirstSight, 95 AmJ Int L 489 (2001); Paul B. Stephan,Accountability
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Customary international law implicates particular democratic
legitimacy concerns.19 Unlike a statute or treaty, customary international law does not involve any agreed-upon text voted upon
by U.S. representatives. Moreover, the most populist branch of
the government, the Congress, has at most a very indirect role in
the formation of customary international law. Rather, U.S. involvement in customary international law formation comes primarily from the Executive Branch. Nor, even with this involvement, is there any guarantee that the U.S. position will prevail or
that customary international law will reflect U.S. legal traditions
and culture. The United States simply has one important voice in
a community of over 190 diverse nations, many of whom may
themselves be undemocratic. Finally, unlike with many treaties,
the United States has no unilateral authority to withdraw from
customary international law rules once those rules are established.
International adjudicatory institutions, despite offering potential benefits of expertise and enhancement of coordination, add
yet another layer of democratic deficit. As noted above, the judges
in these institutions are often appointed with little public attention
or legislative oversight, and many of them may come from nondemocratic regimes. And, unlike domestic courts, these institutions are not embedded in, or closely monitored by, a domestic
society. If U.S. judges were to act as agents of the international
order and bypass the political branches with respect to the implementation of international law and decisions, they would only
compound the democratic deficit.
A good model for enhancing democratic input is the way in
which the United States processes dispute settlement decisions by
the World Trade Organization (W/TO). The international trade
regime, despite its many benefits, is controversial because of its
perceived tensions with other values, such as labor and environmental protection, and this controversy is exacerbated by concerns
over perceptions about its lack of democratic legitimacy. Congress
took account of these concerns in its implementing legislation for
the VTO agreements, making clear that VTO dispute settlement
decisions must be accepted and implemented by the political
and InternationalLawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 Nw J Intl L & Bus 681
(1996-97).
' See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 Chi J Intl
L 457, 465 (2001); McGinnis and Somin, 59 Stan L Rev (cited in note 194).
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branches before they are applied by U.S. courts.'9 6 This requirement has ensured that there is democratic deliberation before
VVTO decisions result in changes to U.S. law, but at the same
time it has not prevented the United States from complying with
even the most controversial WTO decisions.
A second benefit of the constitutionalist perspective is that it
helps compensate for the lack of horizontal checks and balances
at the international level. Because there is no general legislative
or executive body on the international plane, international adjudicative institutions (and other international institutions) typically
operate without any significant horizontal supervision or feedback
(again, the European institutions are a notable exception). While
in theory the parties to the treaty establishing the institution could
amend the treaty if the institution makes poor decisions, or exceeds
its mandate, such amendments may require a supermajority vote
or even unanimity among a highly diverse group of states, so this
option is likely to provide only a very limited check.
The constitutionalist approach reflected in Sanchez-Llamas helps
compensate for this problem by allowing for a subvertical check
on international decision making. Under this approach, international decisions are still binding on the international plane, and
nations will have reputational and other incentives to comply with
the decisions. International institutions will not, however, be able
to enlist domestic courts directly as their enforcement organs. The
implementation of these decisions, rather, will turn in part on their
persuasiveness on the relevant legal issues.
The usefulness of this subvertical check is illustrated by the ICJ's
decision in Avena. The U.S. political branches have repeatedly
resisted efforts over the years to have the U.S. death penalty regulated by international law.'97 Nevertheless, through the Vienna
Convention cases, the ICJ moved into the sensitive realm of the
death penalty, an issue made even more sensitive in the United
States by considerations of federalism. Instead of simply determining whether there were breaches of the Convention (something that was not even contested), the ICJ ultimately opined about
the ability of foreign nationals to raise claims under the Vienna
Convention in U.S. domestic courts, and the relationship of the
196

See Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1594-95 (cited in note 126).
See Bradley, 52 Duke L J at 5 16-35 (cited in note 118).
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Vienna Convention to U.S. domestic procedures. It is unlikely
that the United States could have expected these sorts of decisions
when it ratified the Vienna Convention's optional protocol in
1969, but, as noted, there is no meaningful horizontal check on
the ICJ's compliance with its jurisdictional mandates.' 9 8
A subvertical check was also useful in Avena simply because of
the unclear and possibly confused nature of some of the ICJ's
reasoning. With respect to the issue of procedural default, there
are places in both LaGrand and Avena in which the ICJ suggests
that the application of procedural default rules is problematic only
where the failure of authorities to provide the consular notice is
itself responsible for the failure of a defendant's lawyer to raise
the violation until after conviction.199 It is not clear how this would
occur, however, since lawyers in the U.S. system are on constructive notice of their clients' legal rights, including presumably their
Vienna Convention rights. By analogy, if a defendant fails to receive a Miranda warning, he is not allowed to raise the Miranda
violation for the first time in postconviction proceedings on the
theory that he and his lawyer were unaware of Miranda rights
because they were not informed of them by the police. It is possible
that the ICJ thought that criminal defendants should not bear the
consequences of their lawyers' ignorance or mistakes, but, as the
majority noted in Sanchez-Llamas, that view would be substantially
inconsistent with well-settled features of the U.S. legal system.2"'
In any event, the ICJ never follows up on the idea that a Vienna
Convention violation might itself be responsible for a lawyer's
failure to raise the violation until after conviction. Rather, it simply
concludes without further analysis that the application of procedural default rules in the cases before it violates the treaty, even
though in none of those cases was there a showing that the lawyers'
failure to raise the claim was caused by the lack of consular notification itself.20 ' If the ICJ believed that the application of procedural default rules to bar Vienna Convention claims inherently
violates the treaty, as its holding (although not its reasoning) sug"' For other examples of jurisdictional expansion by international institutions over time,
see Bradley, 55 Stan L Rev at 1577 (cited in note 126).
" See LaGrand,at paras 90-91 (cited in note 16); Case ConcerningAvena, at para 112
(cited in note 20).
200See 126 S Ct at 2686 n 6.
201See Case Concerning Avena, at paras 113, 134 (cited in note 20).
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gests, this would mean that even if a defendant's lawyer purposely
avoided raising a Vienna Convention claim at trial, the defendant
could raise the claim years later, something not allowed even for
constitutional claims, even during the days of the Supreme Court's
most expansive approach to habeas corpus."'
In his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Breyer creatively attempted to clarify the ICJ's holding on this issue, suggesting both
that a hearing at which the procedural default issue was considered
would constitute "review and reconsideration" that would satisfy
the ICJ's required remedy, and that procedural default rules could
be applied to bar Vienna Convention claims if states allowed defendants to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
on their counsel's failure to raise the Vienna Convention issue in
a timely manner.2"3 There is no hint of these glosses in Avena,
however, and they would completely negate the ICJ's procedural
default holding. If the procedural default hearing would itself satisfy the ICJ's requirements, then it makes no sense for the ICJ to
have ruled that U.S. application of procedural default rules violated the treaty. As for the possibility of raising an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the ICJ was made aware of that possibility in LaGrand,but it did not appear to affect the ICJ's analysis
of procedural default.2" 4 Moreover, if defendants can in fact bring
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on Vienna Convention violations (as might be the case, subject to the usual stringent
requirements of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine),
then, once again under Justice Breyer's logic, the ICJ's finding of
a conflict between the Vienna Convention and procedural default
rules was erroneous.
It is possible, of course, that the ICJ, which has only one U.S.
judge, was simply confused about how procedural default rules
worked in the United States, which has both an adversarial system
and a federal system of government. This would be entirely understandable given the complex body of domestic law implicated
202 See Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963) (allowing denial of habeas corpus relief where
there has been "deliberate bypass").
203 See 126 S Ct at 2699-2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
204 See LaGrand,at para 71 (noting Germany's argument that "due to the doctrine of
procedural default and the high postconviction threshold for proving ineffective counsel
under United States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later than the trial phase could
not 'remedy the extreme prejudice created by the counsel appointed to represent the
LaGrands"') (cited in note 16).
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by that issue. If so, however, this simply confirms the desirability
of the domestic filter entailed by the constitutionalist approach.
A third advantage of the constitutionalist approach to international adjudicatory decisions is that it helps ensure that, when
international decisions are implemented domestically, they are tailored to take into account local laws and conditions. Domestic
legal systems vary substantially, and international adjudicative institutions will not have significant expertise with respect to any
one particular system. As noted, this problem is evident in the
ICJ's analysis of U.S. procedural default law in Avena. This is also
an issue for international regulatory decisions, such as those issued
by the WTO, which often intersect with complex bodies of federal
statutory and administrative law, and sometimes state law as well.
Even the ICJ seemed to recognize the value of this function in
its pre-Avena Vienna Convention decisions, noting in LaGrand,
for example, that the "choice of means [for implementing the
Article 36 obligations] must be left to the United States."
Finally, this local filtering and tailoring will likely make the
decisions more acceptable to those who disagree with them. Domestic actors will have a better sense of how international laws
and decisions fit within the broader framework of the domestic
legal system, and about what is acceptable in their polity. In a
federal system like the United States, this includes considerations
of what is acceptable at the state and local levels.2"' These considerations are particularly significant for international decisions,
because, unlike a domestic court, international adjudicators are
not typically able to draw upon a shared experience or culture to
enhance acceptance of their decisions. °6 The U.S. Supreme Court,
by contrast, does this regularly. To take just one example, consider
Missouri v Holland, in which the Supreme Court (through Justice
Holmes, a veteran of the Civil War) reminds readers that the
development of the Constitution initiated by the Founders "has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood
to prove that they created a nation," and then observes that "[t]he
20.See, e.g., Karen Alter, Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute
Resolution System, 79 Intl Affairs 783, 793 (2003) ("Being products of their national political
environment, and working within the same cultural and political context in which they
adjudicate, national judges are far more likely to be in harmony with political sentiment.").
206See Movsesian, UnderstandingSanchez-Llamas (cited in note 160) (making this point);
see also Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization:
Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 Mich J Intl L 775 (1999).
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case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
7
ago.)
C.

20

COUNTERVAILING VALUES

There are two potential countervailing values in this context:
the need for uniformity in the interpretation and application of
international law, and the desirability of enhancing compliance
with international obligations. The dissenters in Sanchez-Llamas
emphasized the first value, noting that uniformity was "an important goal of treaty interpretation," and arguing that "the ICJ's
position as an international court specifically charged with the duty
to interpret numerous international treaties (including the Convention) provides a natural point of reference for national courts
seeking that uniformity. 2 °8 This value was also emphasized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in its early decisions in explaining why states
owed more than "respectful consideration" to its decisions. In
Martin v Hunter's Lessee, for example, the Court emphasized the
need for uniformity in explaining why it had appellate jurisdiction
over state court interpretations of federal law:
Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might
differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States,
or even the constitution itself: Ifthere were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and
harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the
constitution of the United States would be different in different
states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public
mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be
truly deplorable; and it cannot be believed that they could have
escaped the enlightened convention which formed the constitution.2 °9
This value of uniformity, however, is much weaker in the context
of international adjudication (outside of the European system) than
with respect to a national constitutional court like the Supreme
Court. The fragmented nature of the international adjudicatory
207252

US at 433.

208 126 S Ct at 2700 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
209 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816).
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system, and the highly varied nature of the jurisdictional relationships within that system, makes uniformity unlikely under any
circumstances. As discussed, the various tribunals can and do differ
among themselves, and much of their jurisprudence is formally
binding only with respect to particular parties, or is merely advisory. The ICJ's Statute, for example, provides that ICJ decisions
have "binding force" only
"between the parties and in respect of
210
that particular case.
Although the United States participated in the international
adjudicatory decisions at issue in Sanchez-Llamas, it is not a party
to and does not participate in most of the international adjudicatory decisions that are issued, including most ICJ decisions. If
it were bound only by the reasoning in cases in which it participated, this would do little to promote uniformity. On the other
hand, it is difficult to see why the United States should be bound
by the reasoning in cases litigated between other countries, with
different jurisdictional relationships to the institution in question,
in which the United States does not even have an opportunity to
express its views. 21' Of course, that sort of precedential effect is
common with national courts like the U.S. Supreme Court, but,
as discussed, there are fundamental differences between most international adjudicatory institutions and the Supreme Court.
In addition to uniformity, it might be argued that the internationalist approach will enhance compliance with international
legal obligations. Compliance is a particular concern with international law, given the absence of strong centralized enforcement
machinery. If U.S. courts played a more active role in incorporating the output of international institutions, the argument goes,
it would enhance the level of compliance with international legal
obligations.
One problem with this argument is that it assumes that the
output of international institutions will accurately reflect international legal obligations, whereas this is not necessarily the case.
It is not obvious, for example, that the ICJ did a better job than
the U.S. Supreme Court of interpreting the Vienna Convention.
210ICJ Statute, Art 59.
21,The arguments for uniformity may be stronger with respect to the WTO, a centralized and specialized institution with wide membership, compulsory jurisdiction over
the members, and repeat players. Even for the WATO, however, Congress has required
that adjudicatory decisions be filtered through the U.S. democratic process (see text accompanying note 196).
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Nor is it clear that the U.S. judiciary is institutionally better suited
than the political branches to evaluate the content of international
norms, whether treaty-based or customary. Moreover, often the
goal of the internationalist conception is to advance purported
goals of the international legal system where compliance is not at
stake. This is the case, for example, with arguments in support of
broad human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute-the
United States is not required to provide for that litigation, and,
indeed, it is almost unique in the world in doing so."'
In addition, since international law almost never requires a particular role for domestic courts,213 there is no contradiction between the constitutionalist approach and compliance. Under that
approach, the political branches simply play the lead role in making compliance decisions. As noted above, this approach has not
generally resulted in U.S. noncompliance with WTO obligations.
Even with respect to Avena, the Executive Branch has attempted
to comply with the judgment despite disagreeing with the ICJ's
reasoning. Whether the United States complies with Article 36
more generally will depend on a variety of factors beyond whether
this article is determined to create judicially enforceable rights
(the issue left open in Sanchez-Llamas). Those factors include most
notably the degree to which the federal government educates and
pressures state and local governments to comply-something it
has already been doing in recent years, as the ICJ itself has acknowledged. 2" 4
Of course, one might question whether the political branches
will make wise decisions about international law compliance. It is
possible, for example, that the political branches will focus too
much on short-term or parochial concerns, perhaps because of
pressure from special interest groups. This objection, however,
sweeps too broadly; taken to it logical extreme, it would suggest
that U.S. courts should operate as the ultimate policymakers, a
proposition at odds with the basic separation-of-powers structure
212

See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:A Comparativeand InternationalLaw Analysis

of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 Yale J Intl L 1, 17-18
(2002).
23 See, e.g., Lori F Damrosch et al, InternationalLaw: Cases and Materials 160-61 (4th
ed 2001) ("International law requires a state to carry out its international obligations but,
in general, how a state accomplishes that result is not of concern to international law or
to the state system.").
214 See LaGrand, at paras 121, 123-24 (cited in note 16).
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of the Constitution. It is also at odds with various deference doctrines, including the Chevron doctrine in administrative law,
whereby courts accept Executive Branch legal interpretations on
the theory that the Executive is in a better position than the courts
to make the relevant policy assessments relating to the interpretations.2 15
In any event, there are significant reasons to question whether
the courts are functionally better suited than the political branches
to make international compliance decisions. Courts will typically
lack much of the relevant information to assess, for example, the
likely consequences of noncompliance or undercompliance, or of
different forms of compliance, including effects on reciprocity and
on international cooperation more generally. Moreover, there is
an inherent inconsistency in this call for a greater judicial role in
promoting U.S. compliance, since it implicitly assumes that the
political branches will make wise decisions concerning international commitments, including commitments giving authority to
international institutions, while at the same time questioning their
wisdom when it comes to compliance.
CONCLUSION

International tribunals can often play a useful role in facilitating international cooperation. As these tribunals continue to
expand in number and authority, however, it will become increasingly important to understand their proper relationship with domestic courts. Despite the Supreme Court's controversial citation
of foreign and international materials in some of its constitutional
law decisions, and despite recent academic calls for greater "transnational judicial dialogue," the Court indicated in Sanchez-Llamas
that it will insist on a certain degree of autonomy from the international legal system. Although the Court took international
law seriously, it made clear that international law and decisions
will be applied in the United States against the backdrop of the
usual constitutional, procedural, and remedial doctrines that govern the domestic legal system. International dialogue has a role
under this approach, but it is one whereby national courts act as
independent interpreters and filters of international law, rather
L

z' See Eric A. Posner and Cass Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale
(forthcoming 2007).
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than as agents of the international order. This mediating role for
domestic courts is normatively desirable in light of the highly
fragmented and diverse nature of the international adjudicative
system.

HeinOnline -- 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113 2006

HeinOnline -- 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 114 2006

